Salt Typhoon, The Shadow in the Digital Storm

Who is Salt Typhoon?

Salt Typhoon is suspected to be an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group. Their origins are linked to state-sponsored entities in Asia, leveraging their technical expertise to breach some of the world’s most critical telecom infrastructure. Unlike ransomware groups that aim for monetary gain, Salt Typhoon’s primary objective is espionage, focusing on data theft and surveillance.

Timeline of Attacks

1. 2019-2020: Initial Discovery
   Salt Typhoon’s activities first came to light when security firms detected unusual traffic patterns in several Asian telecoms. Analysis revealed that the group had been in systems for months, exfiltrating data silently.
   
2. 2021: Expanding Operations
   The group expanded its operations beyond Asia, targeting European and North American telecoms. During this period, Salt Typhoon exploited vulnerabilities in unpatched servers and leveraged spear-phishing campaigns against employees with privileged access.
   
3. 2022: Focus on Mobile Network Operators
   Salt Typhoon shifted their focus to mobile network operators (MNOs), aiming to intercept text messages, call records, and even real-time conversations. The attacks exploited weak API security, enabling them to access backend systems and core networks.‍
4. 2023-2024: Escalation and Detection
   By 2023, Salt Typhoon’s attacks became more brazen. The group exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in telecom-grade equipment, affecting major providers in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. This led to significant data breaches, including the theft of subscriber information, metadata, and network blueprints.

What Have They Stolen?

Salt Typhoon has targeted several high-value datasets:

1. Subscriber Data: Personal information such as names, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses.
2. Call Detail Records (CDRs): Logs of phone calls, including time, duration, and numbers involved.
3. SMS Content: Access to unencrypted text messages, enabling espionage at scale.
4. Network Architecture: Detailed schematics of telecom infrastructure, providing blueprints for future attacks.
5. API Keys and Credentials: Stolen credentials enabled lateral movement within compromised networks, amplifying the scale of damage.

How Have They Done It?

Salt Typhoon employs a variety of sophisticated methods:

1. Exploiting Vulnerable APIs: Many telecoms rely on APIs for communication between subsystems. Weak API security allowed Salt Typhoon to infiltrate and extract data.
2. Spear-Phishing: Precision-targeted phishing emails deceived high-ranking employees into revealing credentials.
3. Zero-Day Exploits: They utilized unpatched vulnerabilities in telecom-grade routers and switches.
4. Lateral Movement: Once inside a network, they escalated privileges and moved horizontally to extract maximum data.
5. Custom Malware: Salt Typhoon deployed specialized malware to maintain persistence and evade detection.

Who is Affected?

Salt Typhoon’s victims include:

1. Telecommunications Providers: Major players in Asia, Europe, and the Americas have reported breaches.
2. Government Agencies: Agencies relying on these telecom networks for secure communication.
3. End-Users: Millions of subscribers who trust telecom providers with their personal data.
4. Enterprises: Businesses that depend on telecom services for daily operations have faced disruptions and data breaches.

The Case for Data Flow Posture Management

Salt Typhoon’s exploits underline the critical need for Data Flow Posture Management (DFPM). Here’s why:

1. Visibility of Data Exchanges: Telecoms often operate complex, siloed systems. DFPM provides a real-time view of how data moves within and outside the organization, enabling quicker identification of anomalies.
   
2. API Governance: With Salt Typhoon exploiting weak APIs, telecoms must enforce stringent API security policies. DFPM ensures continuous monitoring and control over API interactions.
   
3. Detection of Unusual Activity: Persistent threats like Salt Typhoon rely on staying hidden. DFPM uses AI-driven anomaly detection to flag irregularities, such as unexpected data transfers.
   
4. Third-Party Risk Management: Many telecoms work with subcontractors and equipment vendors. DFPM ensures that all third-party interactions are monitored, reducing the risk of supply chain attacks.
   
5. Regulatory Compliance: Breaches often lead to fines for non-compliance. DFPM automates the tracking and documentation of data flows, making compliance with standards like GDPR, CCPA, or DORA more manageable.
   

Lessons for the Industry

Salt Typhoon’s success reveals weaknesses that extend beyond technical vulnerabilities to operational gaps:

• Siloed Responsibilities: Often, no single team oversees data flows, leading to blind spots.
• Reactive Security Postures: Many telecoms detect breaches after the damage is done. Proactive solutions like DFPM can mitigate risks before they escalate.
• Lack of Continuous Monitoring: Without real-time oversight, telecoms are unable to detect ongoing attacks.

Conclusion

Salt Typhoon serves as a wake-up call for the telecom industry. Their methodical approach, persistence, and ability to exploit weaknesses underscore the need for comprehensive data flow management. Telecom companies must adopt proactive measures like Data Flow Posture Management to safeguard their networks, protect subscriber data, and maintain trust. Without it, they remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversaries who thrive on exploiting the cracks in digital infrastructure.